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Saul Templeton*

A Defence of the Principled Approach to
Tax Settlements

The Canadian Minister of National Revenue is responsible for administering
and enforcing the majority of tax legislation in Canada. Where disputes arise
with particular taxpayers over the correct amount of tax owed, the taxpaying
public ought to have confidence that the Minister has a principled basis in law
for settling disputes for less than amounts previously assessed. Yet opponents
of the principled basis for settlement consistently call for reform, arguing that
compromise settlement should be permissible.
This paper responds to arguments raised for compromise settlement by
reconciling the jurisprudence on the authority of the Minister to settle tax disputes.
It then challenges the Carter Commission's recommendation that U.S. -style offers
in compromise should be available in Canada. Exercise of existing Ministerial
discretion to grant advance rulings and taxpayer relief has been inconsistent,
demonstrating that additional discretion would only deepen public suspicion that
the tax system is administered unfairly.

Au Canada, la responsabilite d'administreret d'appfiquer la majoritd des mesures
16gislatives en fiscalite incombe au ministre du Revenu national. Lorsque
surviennent des differends avec des contribuables relativement au montant
d'impt a payer, les autres contribuables doivent avoir la certitude que le ministre
peut s'appuyer sur une base juridique pour r6gler les differends pour des
montants inferieurs J la cotisation initiale. Pourtant, les opposants 6 cette faqon
de faire reclament continuellement une r~forme, all6guant qu'un reglement sur la
base d'un compromis devrait 6tre permis.
L'auteur repond aux arguments avances en faveur du r~glement amiable en
rapprochant la jurisprudence sur I'autorit6 du ministre de r6gler les diff6rends
d'ordre fiscal. II conteste ensuite la recommandation de la Commission Carter
que des offres de reglement sirrilaires 6 ce qui se fait aux F.-U. devraient 6tre
disponibles au Canada. L'exercice du pouvoir discretionnaire minist6riel actuel
pour accorder des decisions anticipees et des allegements aux contribuables a
ete incoherent, preuve qu'un pouvoir discr6tionnaire accru ne ferait qu'alimenter
les soupqons du public que le r6gime fiscal est administrd inequitablement.
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V.

I. The principledapproach under siege
Public confidence in the administration and enforcement of taxes is
a cornerstone of self-assessing tax systems.' The Canadian Minister of
1. The author relies on the assumption that public confidence in tax administration is a necessary
component of effective tax systems, and indeed a necessary component for public confidence in
governments themselves. While other factors also influence compliance, much of the literature on
improving tax compliance mentions confidence in the administration of taxes as a key factor. See,
e.g., OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Compliance Risk Management: Managing
and Improving Tax Compliance, (OECD, October 2004), online: OECD <www.oecd.org/tax/
administration/33818656.pdf> and US, Government Accountability Office, Tax Gap: Complexity and
Taxpayer Compliance (GAO-I1-747T), (Washington, DC: GAO, 2011) at 1,online: GAO <www.
gao.gov/assets/130/126530.pdf>: "Public confidence in the nation's tax laws and tax administration
is critical because we rely heavily on a system of voluntary compliance. If taxpayers do not have
confidence in the tax system or do not believe that it is easy to understand and treats everyone fairly,
then voluntary compliance is likely to decline."
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National Revenue (the Minister), through the Canada Revenue Agency,
is entrusted with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the
majority of tax legislation in Canada. Where disputes arise with particular
taxpayers over the correct amount of tax owed, the general taxpaying
public ought to have confidence that the Minister has a principled basis in
law for settling disputes for less than amounts previously assessed. It must
be possible to find the tax consequences agreed upon in compliance with
a reasonable interpretation of a tax statute as it applies to the taxpayer's
circumstances. 2 This norm is expressed in both the statutory provisions from
which the Minister draws her authority,3 and in the bulk of jurisprudence
interpreting the application of those provisions to tax settlements in issue
before the courts.4 The requirement that tax settlements have a principled
basis in law is a necessary check against the possibility that the discretion
of the Minister, through her individual agents, will be exercised in an
inconsistent manner. Instances where the public has become aware of even
the possibility that ministerial discretion has been exercised in a capricious
or preferential manner have resulted in protracted, widely publicized
criticisms of the Minister and the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA).' It is
reasonable to assume that these media storms cause some loss of public
confidence in the administration of the Canadian tax system. Thus the risk

2.
The principled approach to tax settlements prevents the taxpayer and the Minister from simply
splitting the difference in dispute. There must be a legal justification for settling on an amount agreed
to by the parties. Most tax disputes are disputes about facts and how they ought to be characterized
according to the law, so it is possible to reach an agreement that some facts be characterized as the
taxpayer sees them and others as the Minister sees them.
3.
At the time of writing, the position of Minister is held by the Honourable Kerry-Lynne D Findlay.
The Minister's obligation to "administer and enforce" tax legislation is found in the Income Tax Act,
RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp), s 220 [ITA] and the Minister was found to be bound by the same principle
in administering the Excise Tax Act, RSC, 1985, c E-15 [ETA] in CIBC World Markets Inc v Canada,
2012 FCA 3, 2012 GTC 1011 [CIBC World Markets, 2012].
4.
A notable exception is Consoltex Inc v R (1977), 97 DTC 724 (TCC) [Consoltex], discussed
below.
5.
Most recently, the CRA has been criticized in the media for allegedly targeting left-leaning
and environmental charitable organizations for audit of their charitable status. It is impossible to
know whether, or to what extent, the CRA has been subject to political pressure to target charities on
ideological grounds. However numerous news reports and public complaints by left-leaning charitable
organizations have led the Broadbent Institute to release a report: Broadbent Institute, "Stephen
Harper's CRA: Selective Audits, 'Political' Activity, and Right-Leaning Charities" (October 2014),
online: Broadbent Institute <https://www.broadbentinstitute.ca/sites/default/files/documents/harperscra-final_0.pdf>. Thus, even the perception of unfairness in the exercise of ministerial discretion (in
this case, the discretion to choose targets for audit) is damaging to the public's confidence that the
CRA is administering tax legislation in an equitable manner. Further, the fact that the CRA manages
(or, on the contrary view, mismanages) discretion to choose the taxpayers it will audit is not a reason
to expand ministerial discretion to areas where discretion is unnecessary. Discretion to choose audit
targets is a necessary concession to the administrability of the tax system, since the CRA cannot assess
everyone, or effectively enforce the tax system by auditing no one.
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of harm from inconsistent exercise of ministerial discretion is twofold:
first, discretion exercised inconsistently by agents of the Minister results in
inequity between taxpayers; second, media coverage of real or perceived
inconsistencies in the exercise of ministerial discretion results in a loss
of public confidence in the tax system. In the context of tax settlements,
the potential for inequitable treatment of taxpayers is significant. The
willingness of individual agents of the Minister to settle on terms more or
less favourable to a particular taxpayer will vary based on the individual
characteristics of the agents themselves, and on the propensity of each
taxpayer to prolong disputes with the Minister either on their own or with
the aid of tax professionals. The principled approach does not guarantee
that taxpayers will be treated consistently in the process of settling tax
disputes. However, it mitigates the risk that settlement amounts will be
arbitrary if concluded on a compromise basis.'
Despite the apparent value of requiring a principled basis in law
for settling tax disputes, and despite Canadian courts' regular insistence
on principled basis settlements, the principled basis for tax settlements
remains controversial. It is frequently proposed that the Minister's
authority ought to be expanded so that compromise settlements can be
struck without black letter statutory justifications for the agreed upon tax
consequences. The requirement that tax settlements have a principled
basis in law was critiqued in the 1966 Report of the Royal Commission on
Taxation, a foundational report on tax policy in Canada.7 Calls for reform
have been made by tax academics and practitioners on a fairly consistent
basis since that time.8
This paper adds to the debate on the principled basis for settlement by
drawing on the significant criticism of ministerial discretion in the context
of advance rulings and taxpayer relief from interest and penalties, 9 and by
6.
For example, in Galvay v MNR, [ 1974] 1 FC 600 (FCA) [Galvay 2] the Minister had agreed to
settle the taxpayer's debt by assessing him as owing $100,000 in respect of both interest and taxes. This
was clearly an unprincipled settlement, since there is nothing to indicate that the Minister calculated
what quantum of tax owing would give rise to interest in an amount that would add up to $100,000, or
considered the legal basis for assessing that amount of tax. (Note there is more than one FCA Galway
decision in 1974.)
7.
Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, vol 5, Chair: Kenneth LeM Carter
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966) [CarterReport].
8.
For example, the call for settlement on a more commercial basis was renewed in Canada, Report
of the Technical Committee on Business Taxation (Ottawa: Department of Finance, April 1998) at
10.8. Academics have argued for compromise-basis settlements more recently in Daniel Sandier
& Colin Campbell, "Catch-22: A Principled Basis for the Settlement of Tax Appeals" (2009) 57:4
Can Tax J 763 and Colin Jackson, "Settlement and Compromise in Canadian Income Tax Law Since
Carter" in Kim Brooks, ed, The Questfor Tax Reform Continues: The Royal Commission on Taxation
Fifty Years Later (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) 295.
9.
Ministerial discretion to cancel or waive interest and penalties is granted by the ITA, supra note
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applying those criticisms to the expansion of ministerial discretion in the
context of tax settlements. Ministerial discretion to grant or deny advance
rulings was the subject of scathing criticism in the CarterReport,0 so it is
surprising that the same report would propose, albeit in a single paragraph,
expanding ministerial discretion in- the realm of tax settlements."
Ministerial discretion to waive or cancel taxes would be redundant in
light of mechanisms already available to reduce taxpayers' debts through
negotiations with the Minister's collections officials, taxpayer relief
applications (for reducing interest and penalties), bankruptcy proceedings,
and, in exceptional circumstances, remission orders. These mechanisms
are all in addition to the ability to conclude principled-basis tax disputes.
There is a positive case to be made for requiring a principled basis
for tax settlements. As outlined above, the principled approach better
ensures that public confidence in the fairness of tax administration will
be protected, even if information about particular settlement agreements
becomes public. 12 The principled basis also protects horizontal and vertical
equity. 3 Similarly situated taxpayers are not at risk of being treated
3, s 220(3.1), but there is no ministerial discretion to cancel or waive taxes in the settlement process.
Remission orders will be discussed below.
10. See CarterReport, supranote 7 at 117-129.
11. The Carter Commission's proposal is at CarterReport, supra note 7 at 149.
12. It would be difficult to gather empirical data about the relationship between tax compliance and
confidence in the fair administration of the tax system, since people who do not comply with tax laws
are unlikely to report their own failure to comply. One study in the US instead measured "tax ethics"
as demonstrated by responses ranking the seriousness of various types of tax non-compliance. The
study also asked respondents how many other taxpayers they thought were non-compliant on a number
of tax offenses. Suspicion that many others were cheating on their taxes was correlated with low tax
ethics. This might suggest that when taxpayers believe others are getting away with lowering their
own tax burdens unfairly (as where public confidence in the fairness of tax administration is eroded),
they are less likely to view tax non-compliance as a serious offense, and potentially more likely to
fail to comply themselves. See Young-dahl Song & Tinsley E Yarbrough, "Tax Ethics and Taxpayer
Attitudes: A Survey" (1978) 38:5 Public Administration Rev 442. See especially at 446-447.
13. These principles, in particular horizontal equity, are contested. The problems with determining
who is similarly situated for the purpose of applying horizontal equity are discussed by David Elkins,
"Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory" (2006) 24:1 Yale L & Pol'y Rev 43, which points
out that horizontal equity attempts to treat similarly well-off taxpayers equally, even though there is
disagreement over what it means for taxpayers to be similarly well-off. See also, Paul R McDaniel
& James R Repetti, "Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange" (1993) 1:10
Fla Tax Rev 607, discussing the Musgrave/Kaplow debate on whether horizontal and vertical equity
have any normative content, and concluding that they do not and must be underpinned by independent
theories of justice. Vertical equity is generally accepted since it is underpinned by theories of social
and distributive justice, and one of the goals of the income tax is redistribution of resources in the
economy (Brian Galle, "Tax Fairness" (2008) 65:4 Wash & Lee L Rev 1323 at 1324. Horizontal
equity is more controversial, since it requires an assumption that the pre-tax distribution of income
is just. It might not be equitable, under a social or distributive justice theory, to collect the same
amount of tax from two taxpayers when one of them put in greater effort, education and time but
received the same income. Market distributions of income have no moral status, therefore there is
no justification for preserving equity of after-tax distributions between similar pre-tax incomes. See
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differently if the Minister splits a tax liability with one of them on the basis
of litigation risk (a factor that is irrelevant for the purposes of determining
a correct amount of tax owing). Taxpayers with greater resources, and
access to representation by tax professionals, will not be able to pressure
the Minister into settlement solely on the basis of greater litigation risk.
Canadian taxpayers have the right to expect that tax settlements concluded
behind closed doors comply with tax laws.' 4 No taxpayer should be above
tax law by virtue of negotiating an unprincipled compromise on tax
assessed. "
II. The legal backdrop: Statutory andjudicial authorityfor limits on the
Minister's discretion
Subsection 220(1) of the ITA provides that the Minister "shall" administer
and enforce the Act. Canadian courts have interpreted this provision
narrowly, to disallow the Minister to assess taxpayers other than in
accordance with the ITA.1 6 In the context of ministerial discretion to
the summary of critiques of horizontal equity, ibid at 1334-1335. As a practical matter, it seems it
would be difficult for tax legislators and administrators to determine how two people with similar
income from a similar source should be taxed differently. There are many examples in Canada where
benchmarks for determining which taxpayers are similarly situated appear unjust. For example, wages
result in an inclusion of employment income, but someone who receives the same amount of money
as an inheritance will not have to include it in income, even though both taxpayers are better off by
the same dollar amount. Any attempt to define a benchmark for who should be treated equally for
tax purposes will be subject to debate. For a discussion of the baseline, policy and computational
indeterminacies that undermine the claim that similarly situated taxpayers will be equitably treated
in tax assessed, see Shu-Yi Oei, "Getting More by Asking Less: Justifying and Reforming Tax Law's
Offer-in-Compromise Procedure" (2012) 160:4 U Pa L Rev 1071 at 1086-1093. Even assuming that
horizontal equity has no normative justification from a market distribution perspective, and that tax
assessed is subject to indeterminacies, it does not follow that a solution to these problems can be
found in the expansion of ministerial discretion to settle tax disputes on the basis of litigation risk.
If anything, such discretion would introduce an additional indeterminacy in assessing tax liabilities.
Use of the principle of horizontal equity throughout this paper assumes it is possible to determine
similar tax liabilities for similarly situated taxpayers under existing legislation. The Minister must
administer and enforce tax statutes that make some attempt at measuring tax assessed in a manner that
accords, however imperfectly, with the values of Canadians as expressed in enactments of Parliament.
Additional ministerial discretion to compromise on tax liabilities will not make the tax system more
equitable as between similarly situated taxpayers. This is true whether "'similarly situated"' takes its
meaning from income and tax as assessed by the tax statutes we have, or from a broader theory of
distributive justice that it is probably safe to say the Minister and her agents are not equipped to apply
consistently in the tax dispute resolution process.
14. As will be discussed below, settlements concluded on consent to judgment are public since they
require a court to issue a decision approving the settlement. Other pre-trial forms of settlement remain
confidential.
15. The author acknowledges that "rule of law" (alluded to) and "rights" as used here are not
uncontested concepts as they apply to taxation. This paragraph should reveal, however, the normative
assumptions from which argumentation will flow in this paper. For a theoretical discussion of
normative frameworks in tax, see e.g. Sagit Leviner, "The Normative Underpinnings of Taxation"
(2012) 13:1 Nevada LJ 95.
16. See Ludmer v Canada, [1995] 2 FC 3 (FCA) [Ludmer] and Harris v Canada, [2000] 4 FC 37
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administer the ITA by issuing advance tax rulings, the Federal Court of
Appeal in Harris v. Canada contrasted the narrow discretion granted by
the ITA to the broad discretion granted by tax legislation in Britain. 7 Harris
cites the House of Lords interpreting the statutory wording, "' [i]ncome
tax...shall be under the care and management of the Commissioners ' 18 to
grant "'wide managerial discretion as to the best means of obtaining for the
national exchequer from the taxes committed to their charge the highest
net return that is practicable having regard to the staff available to them
and the cost of collection.""' 9 In other words, the U.K. system allows for
tax settlements on the basis of litigation risk, while the Canadian system
does not recognize tax settlements unless their terms are justifiable under
substantive tax law. Harris approves of the characterization of Canadian
powers to administer the ITA in Ludmer v. Canada,2° stating that "[n]either
the Minister of National Revenue nor his employees have any discretion
whatever in the way in which they must apply the [ITA]. They are required
to follow it absolutely."' 2' As will become clear, this requirement is rarely
a bar to settling a tax dispute. Where the dispute is rooted in the facts of a
case, there are typically multiple transactions or amounts in dispute over
multiple taxation years, and it is.
possible for the Minister to concede some
tax owing by finding a factual basis to characterize some transactions or
amounts in a manner that is more favourable to the taxpayer. It is where
cases are rooted in interpretations of law that they are difficult-if not
impossible-to settle. There is value in litigating such cases, since the law
is developed and clarified through court decisions on issues of law.
I. Methods of settlement
The requirement for a principled basis in law is not a bar to settlement
in most cases. Approximately 90 per cent of tax disputes are settled
22
before a notice of appeal is filed at the Tax Court of Canada. Most of
the remaining tax disputes are settled in the litigation stage but before
trial. There are different legal mechanisms for concluding tax settlement
agreements before and after a notice of appeal has been filed, which
historically have had different consequences for how strictly the parties
(FCA) [Harris], discussed below. Note that the Minister also does not have the power to assess other
than in accordance with the ETA, supra note 3 as discussed below in CIBC World Markets, 2012, supra
note 3.
17. Harris, supra note 16.
18. Inland Revenue Comrs v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd,
[1981] 2 All ER 93 at 98 (HL (Eng)) [Inland Revenue], cited in Harris,supra note 16 at para 34.
19. Inland Revenue, supranote 18 at 101, cited in Harris,supra note 16 at para 35.
20. Ludmer, supra note 16.
21. Ibid at 17, cited in Harris, supranote 16 at para 36.
22. Sandier & Campbell, supra note 8 at 764.
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must adhere to legal principles in order for the settlement agreement to
be recognized by the courts and bind either or both parties. The courts'
apparent inconsistent treatment of settlement agreements as valid and
binding has been raised as grounds for amending tax statutes to permit
compromise settlements. However, as will be shown below, it is possible
to reconcile the jurisprudence, and fairly simple to design a principled
settlement agreement so that it is symmetrically enforceable against both
the taxpayer and the Minister.
a. Binding on the taxpayer: Waiver of the right to objection or appeal
It appears that a settlement agreement, even if unprincipled, will be
binding on a taxpayer if the taxpayer has waived their rights of objection
or appeal in writing.23 There is a statutory basis for prohibiting objection
or appeal after waiver by the taxpayer independent of whether the terms
of the waiver-as-settlement agreement make it ultra vires the Minister.24
Taxpayers can ensure that the settlement terms make the waiver conditional
on the Minister assessing in accordance with the terms of the settlement
agreement, as the Minister will not necessarily include such a term in its
standard form waiver. 25 In the absence of such a term, it would appear
that the waiver could still be binding on the taxpayer, and would prevent
the taxpayer from objecting to a new assessment or appealing, even if the
Minister did not assess in accordance with the terms of a compromise
26
settlement.
b. Binding on the Minister and the taxpayer: Consent to judgment
Once at the Tax Court of Canada appeals stage, settlements can be effected
27
by filing a joint consent to judgment, containing the settlement terms.
If the judge finds the settlement acceptable, judgment will be issued
accordingly, and will be binding on both parties. 28 However, the courts
do not have the authority to issue judgment on a settlement, where the
judgment would not be one that the court itself could have granted after

23. Often, a settlement agreement at the audit or appeal stage is drafted as a "waiver to the right of
objection or appeal" and the terms the Minister has agreed to in exchange for the waiver are included.
24. ITA, supra note 3, ss 165(1.2), 169(2.2).
25. See Bruce Russell, "Waiving Objection/Appeal Rights: Art of the Deal" (2006) 3:6 Tax Hyperion.
Note there is new case law, discussed below, that supports the notion that a clause making a waiver
conditional on the Minister fulfilling her obligations under the settlement agreement would be binding
(i.e., if the Minister did not fulfill the terms of the settlement, the taxpayer should have the right to
appeal the resulting reassessments).
26. Nothing in the ITA, supranote 3, ss 165(1.2) or 169(2.2) make a waiver conditional on actions
of the Minister.
27. Tax Court of CanadaRules (General Procedure), SOR/90-688a, r 170 [TCC Rules].
28. Colin Campbell, Administration of Income Tax, 2011 (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) at 566.
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hearing the appeal. 29 In other words, the Minister cannot be ordered by the
court to assess other than in accordance with the terms of the ITA. 30 In order
to give effect to a compromise settlement not otherwise in accordance with
the terms of the ITA, parties will often agree to some set of facts, to which
the correct application of the law results in a compromise amount of tax,
interest and penalties.3' The court will generally accept these principled
32
settlements in issuing judgment on consent.
Bound depending on the terms: Settlement 'for the purpose of
disposing of an appeal"
The taxpayer can also conclude a private settlement agreement with the
Minister after a notice of appeal has been filed by agreeing to file a Notice
of Discontinuance with the Tax Court upon issuance of a reassessment
that is in accordance with the terms of the settlement. Proceedings on the
matter would be stayed pending settlement, and the settlement agreement
in such a case would likely also contain a waiver of the right to object or
appeal the new reassessment.
Settlements "for the purpose of disposing of an appeal" under section
169(3) of the ITA allow the parties to settle privately, without a judgment
being issued. 33 The wording of section 169(3) allows the Minister to
reassess years that would otherwise be statute-barred, with the consent of
the taxpayer and for the purposes of settling an appeal. These settlements
may contain "unprincipled" or "compromise" solutions to a tax dispute,
34
and in such cases the settlements will not be binding on both parties.
In some cases, a section 169(3) settlement will go so far as to contain a
clause that confirms the parties' understanding that the appellant has an
unconditional right to a hearing at the Tax Court of Canada. While such
settlements are not ideal from the perspective of upholding the rule of
law in resolving tax disputes, they are an answer to the objection raised
by proponents of compromise settlements that it is impossible to settle
all-or-nothing, single issue tax disputes under the current regime. Parties
can be creative with settlements not submitted to the court for consent to
judgment. For example, parties could agree that an amount the Minister
c.

29. Galway v MNR, [1974] 1 FC 593 (FCA) at 595 [Galway I]. Note that there is more than one
FCA Galway decision on consent to judgment in 1974. These references are to the April 22nd case.
The June 6th case is discussed under the "Galway" heading, below.
30. Galway 1, supra note 29 at 596.
31. Campbell, supra note 28 at 566. See also Ed Kroft, "Settlement Strategies in Tax Disputes" in
Canadian Tax Foundation, 2001 PrairieProvinces Tax Conference Report (Toronto: CTF, 2001) 5:1.
32. Campbell, supranote 28 at 566 [Kroft, "Settlement Strategies"].
33. Ibid.
34. See Consoltex, supra note 4, explained below.
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has assessed as interest income will be characterized as active business
income for the purposes of calculating corporate tax payable. In a residency
dispute, the Minister could agree to treat the taxpayer as a non-resident
in some years but not in others. As long as a reasonable interpretation
of the facts supports divisions along these lines, such settlements appear
unproblematic. If the recharacterization is a fiction-as would likely be
the case in recharacterizing interest income as active business incomethen the resulting seftlement may be as problematic as ,a compromise
settlement from the perspective of ensuring the rule of law in taxation is
upheld. These kinds of settlements remain confidential unless one party
reneges and the settlement agreement ends up before the Tax Court. It
is therefore impossible to gauge how often the principled approach to
settlement is ignored in pre-trial settlements. Practitioners acknowledge
that, in practice, limiting tax settlements to terms that have a principled
basis in law is not a significant barrier to settlement.35 It is a rare tax dispute
that involves a single transaction in a single taxation year that can only be
characterized as, e.g., on account of income or capital, and on which no
horse trading can be done, e.g., expense deductibility. The possibility of
settlement is limited only by the creativity of the parties, though in many
cases it may be a matter of opinion whether the interpretation of the facts
resulting in a settlement according with the law is reasonable. However,
the fact that compromise settlements might currently be concluded under
the guise of principle is not a reason to expand ministerial discretion so
that compromise settlements will be enforceable in court. If anything,
such expansion would exacerbate an existing legitimacy problem within
Canada's system of tax administration and dispute resolution.
2. Jurisprudence:Both the taxpayer and the Minister are bound by
principledsettlements
The complexity and apparent contradictions in the case law on tax
settlements are often offered up as a reason for legislative reform of the
Minister's authority to settle. Unresolved issues in the case law have also
been offered up as potential sources of future unfairness to taxpayers. This
part of the paper will review the jurisprudence criticized by proponents of
compromise settlement and demonstrate that it is possible to reconcile the
case law. Further, it will demonstrate that the unresolved issues identified
have either been resolved since they were raised, or would be possible
to resolve by referring to new jurisprudence in a manner that does no
injustice to taxpayers under the current principled approach.
35. Pooja Samtani & Justin Kutyan, "Special Report: Tax Litigation Demystified" (2011) 59:3 Can
Tax J 527 at 534. See also Kroft, "Settlement Strategies," supra note 31.
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a. Reconciling Smerchanski, Galway 2 and Cohen
Smerchanski v. MNR 3 6 is a foundational case on the juridical enforcement
of settlements. Laskin C.J., for the Supreme Court of Canada, bound the
taxpayers where the rights to object and appeal had been waived. In that
case, the taxpayers had admitted to tax evasion and agreed to pay the tax,
interest and penalties flowing from the Minister's assessment of their
previously unreported income. They then sought to appeal the assessments
despite having waived their right to do so. Laskin C.J. said the threat of
prosecution did not vitiate the waivers, as prosecution is always a threat
where taxpayers make false or misleading statements in a tax return (as
had been the case in Smerchanski). The ITA has since been amended to
codify the principle in Smerchanksi, namely that taxpayers are bound by
their agreements to waive their rights to object and appeal on particular
issues.37
At first glance, Smerchanski appears to be inconsistent with later
decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal,38 to the extent that Laskin
C.J. suggested, "[t]here is no doubt of the enforceability of compromise
agreements... absent vitiating circumstances." 3 9 This would appear to bind
taxpayers to compromise settlements, except that "vitiating circumstances"
can be interpreted to mean circumstances where the Minister has no
basis in law for assessing taxpayers in accordance with a compromise
settlement. As was later pointed out in 1390758 Ontario Corp. v. R.,
nothing in Smerchanski suggested that the assessments flowing from the
settlement agreement did not accord with an interpretation of the facts in
accordance with the law.4"
In Galway 2, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that it could not grant
an application for consent to judgment where the parties consented to a
compromise settlement. 4 The amount in question was either fully taxable,
or not taxable at all, depending on whether it was characterized as business
income or as a gift. The Minister did not have discretion to tax only part
of an amount in dispute, so the court could not rule that it should do so.
The Court in Galway 2 stated that it had doubted its jurisdiction to grant

36.

Smerchanski v MNR, [1977] 2 SCR 23 [Smerchanski].

37. ITA, supra note 3, s 169(2.2) disallows appeal where the right of objection or appeal on a
particular issue has been waived by the taxpayer in writing. Section 165(1.2) disallows objection
where the right of objection on a particular issue has been waived by the taxpayer in writing.
38. 1390758 Ontario Corp v R, 2010 TCC 572 at para 36, 2010 DTC 1385 [1390758] has also been
cited in support of the proposition that settlements on the basis of agreed facts are binding (see, e.g.,
CIBC World Markets, 2012, supranote 3 at para 24).
39. Smerchanski, supranote 36 at 31.
40. 1390758, supranote 38.
41. Galvay 2, supranote 6.
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an application for consent to judgment where, "the proposed judgment
appeared to be intended to implement a compromise settlement rather than
to implement an agreement between the parties as to how the assessment
should have been made by application of the law to the true facts. 42 The
settlement agreement in Galway 2 appeared particularly arbitrary since the
Minister had agreed to assess the taxpayer for $100,000 in respect of both
interest and penalties. There was nothing to suggest that the parties had
turned their minds to a correct amount of tax assessed that would give rise
to a sum of $100,000 when interest was included, or what the legal basis
for assessing that amount of tax would be. It was clear that the parties had
simply split the difference. The court's discomfort with issuing a consent
to judgment on an apparently arbitrary lump sum of tax and interest is
palpable:
[I]n the circumstances of this case.. .the appropriate judgment would be a
judgment that sets the judgment of the Trial Division aside and refers the
assessment back for re-assessment on the basis of the fact agreed upon
43
without attempting to determine the amount of tax or interest payable.
Such a lump-sum settlement could have been reached on the basis of
litigation risk, and in that sense would not have been arbitrary. However,
the court found that the correct criterion for an enforceable tax settlement
44
was whether it was based on an "application of the law to the true facts."
However as indicated in the block quote above, Galway 2 allows the
parties flexibility to agree to what the true facts are. Galway 2 is still the
authoritative case on the non-binding nature of compromise settlement
45
agreements.
The Federal Court of Appeal also refused to enforce a settlement
agreement against the Minister in Cohen v. R. 46 The taxpayer argued
that the Minister could not treat gains on the sale of property as income,
because the Minister had agreed to treat them as capital gains. In exchange,
the taxpayer had agreed not to object to the assessment of similar gains
as income in other years. The Federal Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
judge's holding that the Minister could not assess an amount implementing
a compromise settlement, and added that such an agreement was "illegal,"
47
and could not bind the Minister.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Ibid at 602.
Ibid at 603.
Ibid at 602.
As cited in, e.g., C1BC World Markets, 2012, supranote 3.
Cohen v R (1980), 80 DTC 6250 (FCA) [Cohen].
lbid at 6251.
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At first glance, the result in Cohen appears more troubling than that in
Galway 2. It seems overly inflexible to find a settlement illegal where it
divides up similar transactions in different years for different treatmentif it can be shown that some facts support the different characterizations.
There was no suggestion in Cohen that the parties had identified any such
supporting facts. The characterization of amounts as on account of sale of
capital property, or as on account of business, is one of the most litigated
issues in tax law. The law with respect to these so-called trading cases is not
controversial; it is the facts that lead to controversy and to litigation. The
former Chief Justice of the Tax Court, Donald Bowman, criticized Cohen
for declaring that a common method of settling trading cases, to agree that
some amounts will be on income account and others on capital account, is
illegal.48 It seems that Cohen should not preclude the settlement of future
trading cases where the settlement divides up transactions according to
factually supportable categories of capital and income. For example, it
is possible that some early transactions were dispositions of investment
properties (and therefore capital in nature) and later ones were "in the
nature of trade" since the taxpayer's intent and level of sophistication
changed.49
Consoltex Inc. v. Canada dealt with a settlement agreement in which
the taxpayer did not submit a waiver of its right to appeal.5" On that
basis, Bowman C.J. (Tax Court, as he then was) distinguished the facts
in Consoltex from those in Smerchanski, where the Supreme Court had
bound the taxpayers to their agreement to waive rights of appeal. Chief
Justice Bowman ruled that unprincipled settlements which would not be
binding on the Crown could not also be binding on a taxpayer:
It is unconscionable enough that the Minister should be able to renege
on settlements that he or she has made. It would be doubly indefensible
that a taxpayer should be unilaterally bound to honour agreements that
the Minister is free to repudiate.5
He could not overrule the decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal
concluding that compromise settlements are not binding on the Crown;
however, he could rule that neither should those settlements be binding on
taxpayers. This was not the ideal result, but it was the "least unacceptable"

48. Consoltex,supra note 4 at 731.
49. See ITA, supra note 3, s 248 "business," and, e.g., the foundational cases MNR v Taylor, [195660] Ex CR 3 and Regal Heights Ltd v MNR, [1960] SCR 902.
50. Consoltex,supra note 4.
51. Ibidat 732.
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result.5 2 However, the result in Consoltex, finding the taxpayer was not
unilaterally bound by compromise settlement, may be limited to situations
where the taxpayer has not waived the rights to objection and appeal.
(Recall that the result in Smerchanski, that taxpayers are bound by their
waivers, was reconciled with Galway 2 and Cohen on the basis that the
assessments flowing from the Smerchanski settlement had a principled
basis in law-there was no unprincipled compromise to which neither party
could be bound. Absent new statutory provisions that unconditionally bind
taxpayers to their waivers, an illegal compromise settlement might also
vitiate waivers to the rights of objection and appeal.) The new statutory
provisions do not place conditions on the binding effect of waivers, thus
taxpayers may still be unilaterally bound to a compromise settlement
where a waiver has been submitted.13 New case law, discussed below,
suggests that it is possible to make the waiver of the taxpayer's rights to
objection and appeal conditional on the Minister fulfilling her obligations
under the settlement agreement.
1390758 further reconciles the body of case law on tax settlements. 4
In 1390758, the Minister brought a motion to quash a corporate taxpayer's
appeals, on the basis that the reassessments under appeal were the result of a
settlement agreement. The motion was allowed, and the appeals quashed, on
the basis that the reassessments made pursuant to the settlement agreement
were in accordance with the facts and law. Justice Bowie made comments
in that case that, contrary to Hogg, Magee and Li,55 the Smerchanski and
Cohen cases are reconcilable. In Smerchanski, as in 1390758, "there
was no suggestion that the assessments were anything other than the
result that flowed from the application of the law to the facts that were
revealed by the audit."56 In other words, Smerchanski is distinguishable
from other cases that found compromise settlements to be non-binding,
since Smerchanski did not involve a compromise settlement. Thus the Tax
Court in 1390758 found grounds to enforce a settlement agreement with
a principled basis, a result further endorsed in Huppe v. R.57 In Huppe,
the taxpayer brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement. The
52. Ibid.
53. See, ITA, supra note 3, ss 165(1.2), 169(2.2) discussed supra. Taxpayers should be able to deal
with this problem by including a clause in the settlement agreement (often submitted in the form of a
waiver) that the waiver is conditional on assessment in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
54. 1390758, supra note 38.
55. Peter W Hogg, Joanne E Magee & Jinyan Li, Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law, 8th ed
(Toronto: Carswell, 2013) at 569-570. Consoltex, supra note 4 cited an earlier edition of the text but
the relevant criticism remains in the 8th edition.
56. 1390758, supra note 38 at para 39.
57. HuppevR, 2010TCC644,2011 DTC1042[Huppe].
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Minister argued that the motion should be summarily dismissed, as the
Tax Court did not have jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, even if such
a settlement agreement were established. Justice Webb ruled that the Tax
Court of Canada does have the jurisdiction to enforce a settlement under
section 171 (1) of the ITA, which grants the Tax Court the power to vacate
or vary an assessment, or to refer an assessment back to the Minister for
reconsideration and reassessment. Taken together, 1390758 and Huppe
demonstrate that tax settlements can indeed be enforced by the courts.
They bind both the taxpayer and the Minister where the settlement has a
principled basis in law. Where the settlement has no principled basis in law,
it is unenforceable against either party per Consoltex. These cases should
put to rest the criticism raised by proponents of compromise settlements
that the requirement for a principled basis in law results in unfairness to
taxpayers, since it was previously unclear whether taxpayers would have
recourse to the courts to enforce principled settlements with the Minister.5 8
The only possible unfairness might result if a court finds a compromise
settlement binding against the taxpayer only, on the basis that a statutory
waiver of the right to objection and appeal has been filed and there is no
clause that invalidates the waiver in case the settlement can be found ultra
vires the Minister. It has been speculated that the unconditional nature of
the statutory language on waivers would prevent taxpayers from appealing
assessments issued on the basis of an illegal compromise settlement. 9
Consoltex, which found that compromise settlements are not enforceable
against either party, could be distinguished since it did not involve waivers.
Such a result might be prevented by relying on Bowie J.'s comments in
1390758 suggesting that Smerchanski (where the taxpayers had submitted
waivers) might have had a different result had the settlement agreement
been unprincipled. However, the ratio in Smerchanski has been enshrined in
statutory provisions that appear to make the waiver of the right to objection
and appeal unconditional. It would seem unjust to use a waiver to prevent
a taxpayer from objecting to, and appealing, an assessment where it flowed
from an unprincipled settlement. The Minister does not have the authority
to settle or assess without a basis in law in the first place. The problem
on these facts arises because of the failure of the statutory provisions on
58. This resolves the first of two outstanding issues raised by Sandier & Campbell, supra note 8 at
775, as not yet decided by the courts. That is, the authors were concerned that taxpayers might not be
able to enforce principled settlement agreements against the Minister,
59. This is raised as the second of two outstanding issues with the enforceability of settlement
agreements in Sandier & Campbell, supra note 8 at 775. For reasons discussed infra, it should not be
a difficult issue for the courts to resolve so that taxpayers are not bound by waivers that are part of a
settlement agreement per the ITA, supranote 3, s 169(3). The courts appear to have interpreted waivers
according to conditions in the settlement agreement itself.
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waiver to stipulate exceptions by acknowledging that waivers should be
void where they are issued as part of an illegal compromise settlement.
This is not a problem with the principled approach to settlement itself.
Fortunately, if this issue does come before the courts, it should be fairly
simple to find authority to resolve it in favour of the taxpayer. The courts
have used language that suggests waivers are not absolute. In Burg
PropertiesLtd. v. Canada,6" the Federal Court of Appeal used language
suggesting that waivers containing a clause that made them conditional on
assessment in accordance with settlement were valid because the Minister
had complied with the condition to the waiver, and assessed the taxpayer
in accordance with the settlement agreement.
The appeals were quashed on the basis that the appellant had entered
into a settlement agreement with the Canada Revenue Agency in which
it was agreed that if the Minister of National Revenue reassessed the
appellant in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement, the
appellant waived its rights of objection and appeal. The Tax Court of
Canada found that the Minister reassessed the appellant in accordance
with the terms of the settlement agreement
so that the appellant *had
6
waived his rights of objection and appeal. 1
This language suggests a causal relationship between the Minister
honouring the terms of her agreement and the binding of the taxpayer to its
waiver. If a waiver can be made conditional on other terms of a settlement
agreement, waivers should not be considered absolute, despite statutory
language that appears to make them so. If parties can agree to conditions
on a taxpayer's waiver, it should also be possible to disregard a waiver
where the taxpayer wishes to appeal an assessment that is outside the
Minister's discretion. Thus the result in Consoltex, that taxpayers are not
bound by compromise settlements, should be extended to situations where
the taxpayer has signed a waiver of the rights to objection and appeal.

60. Burg PropertiesLtd v Canada, 2014 FCA 154, 2014 DTC 5110 [Burg Properties], leave to
appeal to SCC refused, 36046 (18 December 2014). Note that this case involved a waiver of the rights
to objection and appeal under the ETA, supra note 3. However, the language is similarly absolute in
the relevant provisions of that statute. See ETA, supranote 3, ss 301.1(1.6), 306.1(2).
61. Burg Properties,supra note 60 at para 2 [emphasis added].
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b.

CIBC World Markets: Compromise settlement offers have no impact
on costs

One more significant development in the jurisprudence is worth
mentioning, if only to point out that it is consistent with previous case
law, and that it supports the integrity of the justice system in resolving tax
disputes rather than resulting in an injustice to parties settling a dispute.
CIBC World Markets Inc. v. Canada deals with the implications of the
principled approach to settlement for cost awards.6 2 Both the Tax Court of
Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal have rules allowing higher cost
awards to parties who have offered to settle under specific circumstances,
if the result in the final judgment is more favourable to the party who
offered to settle. 3 The policy behind these rules is to encourage settlement
by allowing substantially higher cost awards to a party who has offered to
settle, where it appears the unsuccessful litigant ought to have accepted the
settlement offer instead of pursuing the dispute to judgment.
After a successful appeal of a GST matter at the Federal Court of
Appeal,64 CIBC World Markets made a motion for a higher cost award
running from the date of its settlement offer.65 The settlement, which
offered to allow CIBC to claim 90 per cent of the input tax credits in
66
issue, was filed prior to the taxpayer's unsuccessful Tax Court appeal.
The Minister argued that the'settlement offer should not affect costs, as it
was a compromise settlement and the Minister did not have the discretion
to accept it.
The Federal Court ofAppeal dismissed CIBC's motion on costs, ruling
that the original settlement offer could not affect costs on appeal. The first
flaw in CIBC's request had nothing to do with compromise settlements:
CIBC had not reasserted the settlement offer prior to the appeal at the
Federal Court of Appeal and therefore an increased cost award would
not be granted at the appellate level. As for costs at the Tax Court, the
Federal Court of Appeal accepted the Minister's argument that it was
under a "legal disability" that prevented it from accepting the compromise
settlement offer.67 Following the reasoning in the earlier Federal Court of

62. CIBC World Markets, 2012, supranote 3.
63. TCC Rules, supra note 27, r 147(3)(d), 147(3.1)-(3.7); Federal Courts Rules SOR/98-106, r
400(3)(e).
64. CIBC World Markets Inc v Canada, 2011 FCA 270, [2013] 3 FCR 3 [CIBC World Markets,
2011].
65. CIBC World Markets, 2012, supra note 3.
66. CIBC World Markets Inc vR, 2010 TCC 460, 2010 GTC 94.
67. CIBC World Markets, 2012, supra note 3 at para 16.
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Appeal decisions in Galway 268 and Cohen,69 the court found that since
there was no basis in fact or in law for the Minister to accept the 90 per cent
settlement, the offer should be disregarded for the purpose of awarding
costs. The court reasoned it is an implicit pre-condition in the rules on
considering settlement offers in cost awards that the recipient of the offer
must be legally able to accept the offer. No adverse cost consequences
should flow from failure to accept an offer which is outside the Minister's
discretion to accept. The Federal Court of Appeal did not deal with the
question of whether a compromise settlement offer issued by the Minister
could result in a higher cost award against the taxpayer if the Minister
prevailed on appeal, since that was not the issue before the court. However,
the same logic should preclude an increased cost award for the Minister:
the Minister has no authority to offer to assess without a basis in law for
the assessment-therefore, such an offer should also be disregarded for
the purposes of granting costs.
CIBC World Markets, 2012 has been criticized as being at odds with
the policy behind cost rules encouraging settlement.7" Critics refer to the
reality that many tax disputes are settled before trial, and assume many of
these pre-trial settlements are unprincipled and would be discouraged by an
inability to claim increased cost awards for tendering a compromise offer.7'
The court in CIBC World Markets, 2012 said that the input tax credits
(ITCs) in dispute could not be the subject of a 90 per cent compromise
settlement on the basis of facts and law because the quantum of credits was
not in dispute. The issue was a rare "all-or-nothing question of statutory
interpretation"7 2 on the ability of the taxpayer to change its method for
computing input tax credits to increase its claim. Had the dispute been a
disagreement about the facts surrounding the input tax credits claimed, as
many disputes over ITCs are, it would have been possible to interpret the
facts in such a way that the ITCs could have been divided for the purposes
of settling the dispute. This does not mean that all litigation involving
all-or-nothing disputes wastes judicial resources. Where, as in CIBC
World Markets, 2012, the courts can settle the law on a contested point of
statutory interpretation, there is value in pursuing the dispute to judgment.
68. Galway 2, supra note 6.
69. Cohen, supranote 46. The Federal Court of Appeal also referred to Harris,supranote 16, a more
recent decision affirming the Federal Court of Appeal's position on ministerial discretion in Galvay 2
and Cohen.
70. CIBC World Markets, 2012, supra note 3.
71. See, e.g., Jacques Plante, "Settlement Offers: CIBC World Markets Inc. v. Her Majesty
The Queen" (April 2012) CCH Tax & Accounting eMonthly, online: <www.cch.ca/newsletters/
TaxAccounting/April20l2/lndex.htm>.
72. CIBC World Markets, 2012, supra note 3 at para 19.

A Defence of the Principled Approach to Tax Settlements

Far from being rigid and doctrinaire in its approach to tax settlements
in CIBC World Markets, 2012, the Federal Court of Appeal implicitly
acknowledges that settlement would have been possible had the dispute
been a factual one over the quantum of eligible credits.73 Justice Stratas,
writing for the Court, contrasts settlements that are made "solely on the
basis of compromise" with those that "[follow] the facts and the law as the
Minister views them or might reasonablydefend them."74 This standard of
principled-basis settlement is not insurmountable: it requires a position on
the application of law to facts that is reasonably defensible. This supports
comments made by practitioners prior to CIBC World Markets, 2012 that,
"some would suggest that if the litigants are keen on settling the case, it is
always possible to find a principled basis,"75 with the caveat that disputes
about the correct interpretation of the law often cannot be-and perhaps
should not be-settled prior to judgment.
c. Assessing the jurisprudence:Not as rigidas critics suggest
It may at first appear as though courts have bound the authority of the
Minister on the basis of legal formalism: only the strictest interpretation
of the word "shall" in provisions prescribing the Minister's duties would
prevent the Minister from reaching compromise settlements outside
the letter of the law. This formalistic approach has been criticized on
pragmatic grounds: that it would be more practical for the courts to apply a
looser interpretation of the Minister's obligations and enforce compromise
settlements. However, the courts' apparently formalist interpretations can
also be viewed pragmatically. The Federal Court of Appeal in Galway
2, Cohen, and CIBC World Markets, 2012 is not merely upholding strict
wording for the sake of applying (and not creating) law. Underlying these
judgments, which appear to rest solely on strict interpretation, is concern
that the Minister not exercise discretion in a manner that could be perceived
by the public as arbitrary. Both the $100,000 settlement for all of tax,
interest and penalties in Galway 2 and the 90 per cent settlement offer
in CIBC World Markets, 2012 could be viewed critically by the public
as arbitrary reductions of the tax obligations for litigious taxpayersespecially absent any reasons justifying these settlement terms according
to fact and law. A broader concern is the vast number of tax settlements
that do not reach public scrutiny through the court system. Requiring those
settlements to have a principled basis in law in order to be recognized
by the courts at least forces the Minister to try to get to some justifiable
73.
74.
75.

Ibid.
Ibid at para 25 [emphasis added].
Samtani & Kutyan, supra note 35 at 534. See also Kroft, "Settlement Strategies," supra note 31.
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amount of tax owing-i.e., these cases reflect discomfort with the idea that
the Minister could arbitrarily split the difference as in Galway 2 and as in
the settlement offer at issue in CIBC World Markets, 2012.
Perhaps the most scathing criticism of the current state of the law
resulting from the Federal Court of Appeal decisions in Galway 2 and
Cohen appears in Hogg, Magee and Li's Principles of CanadianIncome
Tax Law:
The CRA has limited resources and it is not realistic to require the
Minister to insist on every last legal point, and to litigate every dispute to
the bitter end. Most disputes about tax are simply disputes about money
which are inherently capable of resolution by compromise. Presumably,
the Minister would agree to a compromise settlement only on the basis
that it offered a better net recovery than would probably be achieved
by continuance of the litigation. It seems foolish to require the Minister
to incur the unnecessary costs of avoidable litigation in the name of an
abstract statutory duty to apply the law.76

With respect, the rigidity described by Hogg, Magee and Li, requiring
the Minister to litigate every last dispute "to the bitter end," would
only be the result of the strictest possible interpretation of Cohen." In
practice, requiring a principled basis for tax settlements does not require
the Minister to litigate every last tax dispute, without regard for the costs
of doing so. It simply requires the Minister and the taxpayer to come to
some reasoned agreement about the merits of facts leaning one way or
another in the circumstances of the dispute. There is usually more than
one issue, more than one category of receipt or loss, and more than one
tax accounting period at issue in a tax dispute, and some agreement can be
reached to divide amounts along any of those lines.
As for the remainder of the Hogg, Magee and Li quotation, tax disputes
are not just about money. The equity of the tax system would be at stake
if the Minister were permitted to settle cases on the basis of the best net
recovery of costs, since such a system would reward particularly litigious
taxpayers. The fact that the U.K., for example, administers its tax system
this way does not mean it would benefit the Canadian system to adopt
such an approach, or be consistent with maintaining the integrity of the
Canadian system. There is some value in a check on ministerial discretion
that requires the parties to settle on some amount of tax that is defensible
76. Hogg, Magee & Li, supranote 55 at 570. The newest edition has not incorporated CIBC World
Markets, 2012, supranote 3, but that case does not deviate from the rigidity that Hogg, Magee & Li
are criticizing.
77. Recall that Cohen, supra note 46 was criticized by former Chief Justice Bowman for its failure
to recognize a common method of settling trading cases in Consoltex, supranote 4 at 731.
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under the law, and there are additional administrative costs associated with
allowing taxpayers to tender compromise settlement offers.7"
The judiciary has articulated the law on principled-basis tax
settlements, particularly in CIBC World Markets, 2012, so that it is flexible
enough to allow settlement in most instances where facts, but not laws, are
in dispute. However, calls are still being made for more research towards
allowing compromise-basis tax settlements.7 9 The remainder of this paper
will deconstruct arguments in favour of extending Ministerial discretion to
settle tax cases on a compromise basis, starting with the CarterReport and
concluding that such extension is unnecessary and would be detrimental to
the integrity of the Canadian tax system.
III. Back to the Carter Report: A selective criticism of ministerial
discretion
The Carter Commission recommended, in its 1966 Report, implementation
of a U.S.-style tax settlement system allowing taxpayers to make offers
in compromise to the Minister. ° However, the recommendation appears
in a single paragraph. Unlike many of the Report's most influential
recommendations on changes to the substantive tax law, this paragraph
appears with no analysis of potential problems with implementing such a
system. It is sandwiched between one paragraph on uncollectible debts and
one on the Commission's concern that taxes might be evaded by taxpayers
leaving Canada. The entire recommendation is as follows:
We also recommend institution of the "offer of compromise" procedure,
available to United States taxpayers, under which a taxpayer owing more
than his net worth may institute proceedings requesting that a settlement
be made for a lower amount. Any such settlement should be made public,
being filed in a registry and available for inspection. Publicity would be
a full safeguard against abuse of such a system. In our view the offer of
compromise procedure should not be available to any taxpayer who had
knowingly understated his income.8

78. See, e.g., the discussion of baseless offers-in-compromise being issued in the US in CNBC
"Need Tax Debt Settlement? Avoid This Scam," CNBC (3 October 2008), online: <www.cnbc.com/
id/27009005/>, cited in Carman R McNary, Paul Lynch & Anne-Marie Ldvesque, "Tax Dispute
Resolution: Is There a Better Way?" in Canadian Tax Foundation, Report of Proceedingsof the SixtySecond Tax Conference (Toronto: CTF, 2011) 14:1 at 14:7.
79. Most recently in Jackson, supranote 8.
80. Carter Report, supra note 7 at 149. Interestingly, the Carter Commission's recommendation to
allow a US-style system of offers in compromise pre-dates the case law that is typically cited for the
proposition that the Minister's discretion to settle is limited to settlement on a principled basis. See
also Jackson, supra note 8. That chapter suggests that more research is required to implement the
CarterReport's proposal on settlement.
81. CarterReport, supranote 7 at 149.
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There are several problems with this recommendation that suggest
that it should not be used as the basis for reforming today's system of
tax administration, and that the members of the Carter Commission
perhaps did not think through the consequences of such a program.8 2 First,
other mechanisms are available to taxpayers who cannot pay their full
tax debt because of financial constraints, so an additional mechanism is
redundant. For example, it is possible for taxpayers to obtain a discharge
into bankruptcy that can relieve them of some or all of their tax obligation.
Taxpayers also can negotiate a tax debt payment plan with the Minister
if they cannot pay a tax debt in full immediately. It is not clear that
additional ministerial discretion is required to deal with the insolvency of
tax debtors. Second, this recommendation appears after a lengthy section
in the immediately preceding chapter of the Report expressing concern
83
over existing ministerial discretion to grant or deny advance tax rulings.
1. Problems with ministerialdiscretion:Advance ruling requests
The Commission's conclusion on ministerial discretion to grant or deny
advance rulings summarizes its concerns:
Ministerial discretion should be kept to a minimum in tax legislation;
where it is employed, the taxpayer should have the right to require an
advance ruling on stated facts, and a parliamentary committee each year
should examine the manner in which the discretionary powers
have been
84
used and report on the continuing need for the discretion.
Why is so much concern expressed over the Minister's power to grant or
deny advance rulings, while none is expressed over granting the Minister
additional discretion to grant or deny the proposed offers in compromise?
The issues are similar. In an advance ruling request, a taxpayer requests
an interpretation of the law as it applies to a proposed transaction that
may or may not go forward depending on the Minister's agreement to
grant tax treatment in accordance with the taxpayer's interpretation of
the law. A great deal of tax is sometimes at stake in these advance ruling
requests, and the Minister's exercise of discretion has been the subject of
some scandal in the wake of an Auditor General's report on the rulings

82. Note that the establishment of an offer of compromise procedure does not appear in the
"Conclusions and Recommendations" section at the end of the relevant chapter: ibid at 157-159. The
CarterReport is organized so that major recommendations appear in summary form at the end of each
chapter; therefore, the absence of the offers of compromise procedure from that section is notable and
suggests it was not a recommendation the Commission considered particularly important.
83. Ibid at 126-128; see also at 129-130.
84. Ibidat 130.
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process.85 Controversy over the Minister's exercise of discretion to settle
tax debts in response to an offer in compromise could be expected to be as
great as, if not greater than, the controversy over the discretion exercised
in the granting of advance rulings. It appears that the members of the
Commission simply did not turn their minds to the potential problems
with the ministerial discretion which would have to be granted in order to
implement the proposed system of U.S.-style offers in compromise.
the foundationaljurisprudence interpreting
The CarterReportpre-dates
the scope of the Minister's discretion to administer tax legislation in the
context of settling tax disputes. The Report did contain commentary on the
judiciary's role in curbing inappropriate exercise of discretion, though in
the context, again, of discretion in issuing advance rulings:
[I]n essence, the court has no power to intervene unless it can be shown
that the Minister, in exercising his discretion, acted on erroneous legal
principles, was influenced by irrelevant or improper considerations, or
acted arbitrarily.
In view of the limited scope of the authority of the courts, they cannot
be relied upon to provide the taxpayer with all the protection he requires
against the dangers inherent in the exercise of ministerial discretion.86
The Carter Commission's concern here was protecting the rights of the
individual taxpayer from the arbitrary exercise of ministerial discretion.
Discretion that is exercised inconsistently, especially if it is non-transparent,
risks inequitable outcomes for taxpayers. Looking at the equity of the tax
system more broadly, this inconsistency could create problems for both
horizontal and vertical equity. Similarly-situated taxpayers could be
treated differently, thus violating horizontal equity. This was the concern
87
where the Minister was sued by a concerned citizen for issuing,
in Harris,
allegedly in bad faith, advance rulings to other taxpayers allowing a shift
of taxable property out of Canada without triggering an immediate tax
liability. The concern was that the favourable rulings, which had been issued
privately, contradicted a general announcement the Minister had made
indicating that similar transactions would be subject to deemed disposition
rules, triggering an immediate tax liability. These rulings were the subject
of an Auditor General's report that specifically criticized the Minister for
issuing preferential private rulings that the public was not aware of, thus
85. There is an extensive discussion of the controversy raised by one set of advance rulings in
particular, which it was argued had been issued in bad faith since the Minister had allegedly granted
preferential treatment in issuing the rulings, in Harris,supra note 16.
86. CarterReport, supra note 7 at 127.
87. Harris,supranote 16.

52

The Dalhousie Law Journal

making tax benefits apparently available only to some taxpayers.88 The
Minister won the Harris case, with the Federal Court of Appeal finding
no inappropriate exercise of discretion on the Minister's part. The Carter
Report had anticipated, in the quotation above, the limited ability of the
courts to address arbitrary exercises of ministerial discretion, though its
concern with discretion had been for the individual taxpayer and not for
the integrity of the tax system as a whole. The circumstances underpinning
Harris,as described in the Auditor General's report on ministerial advance
rulings, remain an example of the type of tax equity violation that can
occur if the Minister's exercise of discretion is inconsistent or arbitrary.
In the context of tax settlements in particular, horizontal equity could be
violated where taxpayers are similarly situated but litigious taxpayers are
able to persuade the Minister to offer more favourable settlement terms
under an offer in compromise regime. There are no tax policy criteria
that would justify lower tax burdens for litigious or aggressive taxpayers.
Vertical equity could also be compromised where the Minister is granted
discretion, since taxpayers with greater resources are better able to hire
professionals who can advocate for more favourable settlement terms than
could taxpayers of lesser means.
The CarterReport goes on to suggest that the problems with ministerial
discretion in the advance rulings context could be allayed by requiring
the Minister to subject its exercise of that discretion to public scrutiny.
This would be achieved by reporting annually to Parliament.89 But
publicity may not be a complete safeguard in the advance rulings context,
and perhaps even less so in the settlement context. Who, other than the
taxpayer who is the subject of an advance ruling or tax settlement, would
have standing in a court of law or the desire to challenge the Minister's
exercise of discretion? Harris, at least at the Federal Court of Appeal
level, suggests that concerned citizens would have standing to sue the
Minister where a ruling was issued in bad faith to a third-party taxpayer.90
Similarly, concerned citizens might be moved to challenge a tax settlement
if it seemed to favour a particular taxpayer in a manner that brought the
fairness of tax administration into question. However, the value of opening
tax settlements up for public scrutiny would compete with the perceived
importance of confidentiality in tax settlements. Taxpayers currently can
avoid public scrutiny of a tax dispute with the Minister by settling before

88.
89.
90.

lbid at para 13.
Carter Report, supra note 7 at 128.
Harris,supra note 16 at paras 64-66.
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the matter goes before the Tax Court, so publicizing tax settlements might
remove one of the pressures on taxpayers to settle before trial.
At the time of Harris,advance rulings were not all broadly available
to the public and the profession as they are today. Since 1993, all advance
rulings are released in severed form by the Minister under access to
information legislation. 9' Prior to that time, the Minister published
selected rulings only. Currently, advance rulings are released to private
tax information services used by the tax profession, such as Taxnet Pro
and CCH, but they are also broadly available to the public at sites like
taxinterpretations.com. This kind of publicity appears to be, in combination
with the right of concerned citizens to sue the Minister per Harris, a
complete safeguard to the arbitrary exercise of ministerial discretion in
issuing advance rulings. The redacted advance ruling letters issued by
the Minister have a broad readership among the tax profession, and any
perceived inequity in the issuance of favourable rulings to some taxpayers
but not others would be picked up on by tax professionals. Were the
exercise of discretion particularly egregious, it would be blogged about or
otherwise published by tax professionals and possibly the broader media.
Another public mechanism for relief from taxation is the remission
order, though such orders are considered an extraordinary measure.
Remission orders are granted at the Minister's discretion under the
FinancialAdministrationAct. 92 Where a remission order is granted it is
published in Part II of the Canada Gazette, so in theory there is public
oversight of this type of ministerial discretion. However, where remission
ordets are denied there is no public notice so public scrutiny is not possible
unless the taxpayer either made the denial public or challenged the denial
on judicial review. Still, the public nature of the remission order process,
combined with the opportunity to bring an application for judicial review
to Federal Court, constitute sufficient public and judicial oversight of the
remission order process. Arbitrary exercise of ministerial discretion to
grant remission orders is not a concern on par with the risk of arbitrary
exercise of discretion were the Minister permitted to conclude confidential
settlement agreements with taxpayers on a compromise basis. The
requirement that tax settlements be concluded on a principled basis is an
imperfect stand-in for the safeguard of public scrutiny that is barred by the
public interest in protecting the confidentiality of tax settlements.

91. See Canada Revenue Agency, "Public dissemination of rulings and interpretations" (Ottawa:
CRA), online: <archive-ca.com/page/4043025/2014-05-31/http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/ tx/txprfasnls/
srves/dssmntn/menu-eng.html>.
92. FinancialAdministrationAct, RSC 1985, c F-11, s 23(2).
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Publicity as a complete safeguard against the arbitrary exercise of
ministerial discretion should not be extended to the settlement context
without serious consideration of the competing value of taxpayer
confidentiality. Publicizing tax settlements could expose taxpayers to
having sensitive information revealed merely because they were audited
and negotiated with audit officials prior to reassessment, e.g., by providing
additional supporting information. Consideration would have to be given
to when in the tax dispute resolution process a settlement agreement would
be made public, and what information would be publicized. Taxpayer
information is closely protected in our tax system, and can only be shared
in specific circumstances permitted by statute. 93 That is why advance
rulings, even though they are all made available to various publishers,
are redacted to protect the identities of the taxpayers requesting the
rulings. Tax settlements in the pre-litigation stage currently take place on
a confidential basis, i.e., their terms are not made available to the public
as advance rulings are. 94 Advance rulings do not invoke similar public
policy considerations because they must be requested before a proposed
transaction has taken place. Thus the decision to request or not request
an advance ruling does not affect the administration of justice in the way
that settlement offers do--by potentially reducing the number of tax
disputes the courts must resolve. Moreover, publicity in the context of a
remission order is not a serious concern in terms of protection of taxpayer
information since, as in the case of advance ruling requests, taxpayers
typically apply for or work with the Minister to obtain a remission order.
Taxpayers are also, presumably, aware (or made aware) that successful
requests for remission orders will result in publication of the order. If that
publicity discourages requests for remission orders, it is less troublesome
than if publicized settlement agreements remove the incentive to resolve
disputes prior to litigation in order to protect taxpayer confidentiality.
The Supreme Court of Canada recently reaffirmed the importance
of settlement privilege to the administration of justice in Sable Offshore
Energy Inc. v. Ameron InternationalCorp.:

93. ITA, supra note 3, s 241. Some exceptions to the rule that taxpayer information must remain
confidential are, e.g., to collect data for government statistics and to answer access to information
requests without revealing taxpayers' identities.
94. Some or all terms of a settlement must be made public if the settlement takes the form of a
consent to judgment in the Tax Court of Canada. That is, the parties can agree to settle a case that is
already on the Tax Court docket and, assuming the settlement has a principled basis in law, a judge
can issue judgment according to the terms of the settlement. Such a consent to judgment will become
public since it takes the form of a decision of the Tax Court made on consent of the parties.
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The justice system is on a constant quest for ameliorative strategies that
reduce litigation's stubbornly endemic delays, expense and stress. In this
evolving mission to confront barriers to access to justice, some strategies
for resolving disputes have proven to be more enduringly successful
than others. Of these, few can claim the tradition of success rightfully
attributed to settlements.
The purpose of settlement privilege is to promote settlement. The
privilege wraps a protective veil around the efforts parties make to settle
their disputes by ensuring that communications made in the course of
these negotiations are inadmissible. 9
Given this clear direction from the Supreme Court that settlement
negotiations, and the terms of settlements themselves, ought to remain
privileged except where specific exceptions apply, it would be difficult
to argue that information about individual tax settlements concluded by
the Minister ought to be made public. However, Sable Offshore involved
private parties, and there is less public interest at stake in the fairness of
settlements between private parties. Canadian taxpayers do have a stake
in the fairness and consistency of tax settlements that should be balanced
against the objective of encouraging settlement prior to litigation. An
alternative would be to release settlements in a redacted form, as advance
ruling letters are, sufficient to protect taxpayers' identities. Where the
issue is one that affects a group of taxpayers with separate appeals on
substantially the same issues and facts (for example, the Native Leasing
Services96 cases and charity tax shelters) the terms of settlement could be
leveraged by either the Minister or other taxpayers to further their cause
in future disputes. The Minister might be less willing to settle on issues
common to many taxpayers where others might try to use the settlement
as precedent for similar treatment. Although it involved private parties,
this concern was more or less the one in Sable Offshore, quoted above:
the Supreme Court declined to have the settlement figures agreed upon by
some litigants disclosed to other litigants who had not settled. Settlement
privilege, as a policy in the public interest, was upheld lest future
settlements be discouraged by the possibility that settlement terms could
become public. Similarly, in the tax context, publicizing settlement terms
could foreseeably hinder tax dispute resolution. The goal of expanding
ministerial discretion to conclude compromise settlements would be to

95. Sable Offshore Energy Inc v Ameron InternationalCorp, 2013 SCC 37 at paras 1-2, [2013] 2
SCR 623 [Sable Offshore].
96. See, e.g., Horn v Canada, 2008 FCA 352, 2008 DTC 6743. The issues in that case are common
to hundreds of taxpayers who are litigating their disputes as separate appeals.
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facilitate settlement, and publicizing those settlements to prevent arbitrary
exercise of ministerial discretion could frustrate that purpose.
Could arbitrary exercise of ministerial discretion be curbed if
aggregated data about amounts settled on in an offer in compromise
process were made public? For example, there could be an annual
report of the total tax ceded by the Minister through settlement, and the
average amount of tax ceded in each case. This sort of data is available
through access to information requests for taxpayer relief from interest
and penalties, which the Minister has statutory authority to waive. 97 The
privacy of taxpayers, and settlement privilege, would be protected if data
could be gathered and released on a group basis. However, releasing total
and average tax settlement information would make particular instances of
inconsistent exercise of ministerial discretion impossible to identify. This
can be demonstrated by an attempt to interpret taxpayer relief data.
2. More problems with ministerialdiscretion: Taxpayer relief
The taxpayer relief provisions (formerly the "Fairness Package" at the time
of their introduction in 1991) are best known for permitting the Minister to
waive or cancel interest or penalties. 98 They do not permit the Minister to
compromise on an amount of tax assessed.
a. Taxpayer reliefand voluntary disclosures
The taxpayer relief provisions provide the authority for the voluntary
disclosures program. A taxpayer who voluntarily discloses unreported
income can reach an agreement to pay the tax owing on the unreported
income and receive a waiver of penalties and partial interest relief.99
Granting the Minister discretion to waive interest (and, to a lesser extent,
penalties) is subject to similar equity, transparency, and public confidence
objections as compromise-basis settlement. Whether penalties should be
assessed or waived is a matter of what deterrents to non-compliance (and
incentives for compliance) should apply to best administer and enforce
a self-reporting tax system. To the extent that interest on outstanding tax
liabilities represents the time value of money, waiving interest on a tax

97. ITA, supra note 3, s 220(3.1).
98. The term "taxpayer relief' also encompasses extensions of time to file or amend certain elections,
obtain refunds, reassessments or redeterminations outside the normal three-year assessment period.
This paper will refer to "taxpayer relief' only with respect to relief from interest and penalties. See
ibid.
99. Time constraints on this relief are imposed either by statute or by the CRA's administrative
policy. See Canada Revenue Agency, Income Tax Information Circular ICOO-1R4, "Voluntary
Disclosures Program" (9 April 2014) at para 16, online: CRA <www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/icOO-1r4/
icOO-lr4-e.html>.
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liability is equivalent to waiving part of the tax.' 00 The federal government
justifies this relief on the grounds that voluntary disclosures bring in tax
revenue from unreported income that otherwise might have remained
undisclosed. Sacrificing penalties and some of the tax debt in the form of
interest relief is thought to be consistent with administrability, since the
government presumably collects more tax revenue overall as a result of
taxpayer disclosure of previously unreported income. Taxpayers are still
liable for tax assessed on the previously unreported income, and it is on
that amount the Minister cannot compromise.
It is also thought that strict enforcement of tax, interest, and penalties
might put executors and beneficiaries of the estate of a deceased individual
with unreported income in an unfair position. They are left to decide
whether to disclose unreported income that may stretch back decades (past
the statutory limitation period for relief from interest and penalties) when
they were unaware that the deceased was committing tax evasion until an
examination of the estate is commenced. From the perspective of other,
compliant Canadian taxpayers, there is no reason the estate should not be
liable for the full sum of back taxes, interest, and penalties. Nevertheless,
the discretion granted to the Minister under the taxpayer relief provisions
makes allowance for relief from interest and penalties on submission of a
valid voluntary disclosure.
One widely publicized example of a voluntary disclosure was the
especially generous settlement terms reached with former Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney, who had received cash payments and failed to report
them to the Minister. One Tax Services Office had dealt with his voluntary
disclosure in a manner inconsistent with the treatment by other CRA
officials.' 0' It is reasonable to assume that the negative publicity around
this special treatment of an especially powerful taxpayer contributed to
a perception by much of the public that the voluntary disclosure rules
"' [allow] cheaters to avoid penalties they should be paying."" 2 It is unclear
how much of this negative perception is in response to the ministerial
discretion granted by the voluntary disclosure rules themselves, or a
suspicion that the Minister exercises discretion inconsistently and can be
influenced by more powerful Canadian taxpayers.

100. For an explanation of the relationship between interest and the time value of money, see
Lawrence Lokken, "The Time Value of Money Rules" (1986) 42:1 Tax L Rev 1.
101. Sandier & Campbell, supra note 8 at 784.
102. Dean Beeby, "Canadian tax cheats come clean amid close scrutiny of offshore havens," The
Globe and Mail (14 April 2013), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com>, referring to a 2011 CRAcommissioned poll.
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b. Taxpayer reliefand the settlement process
Beyond the voluntary disclosures program, taxpayer relief may be granted
in extraordinary circumstances that interfere with taxpayer compliance
or payment, in particular, events beyond the control of a taxpayer. Tax
legislation does not set out the specific circumstances in which relief may
be granted, so the Minister has determined that events beyond the control
of the taxpayer include natural disaster, serious illness or accident. Other
circumstances that may warrant relief are actions of the Minister and
financial hardship or inability to pay, typically where the cause of financial
hardship goes beyond what the Minister's collections department would
consider in negotiating a payment schedule. °3 The Minister will also
consider the past diligence and compliance of taxpayers.0 4 The Minister
has created a sizeable Taxpayer Relief Procedures Manual outlining the
Minister's administrative guidelines for granting relief under the broad
discretion to waive interest or penalties granted by statute.0 5 The Taxpayer
Relief Manual does specify that relief from interest and penalties should
not be granted as part of the tax settlement process. 0 6 However, the
Department of Justice can recommend that the Minister waive interest and
penalties after the settlement agreement has been concluded.0 7 Anecdotal
evidence from practitioners also suggests that the Minister is sometimes
willing to agree to look favourably on a taxpayer relief request submitted
after the conclusion of the settlement and reassessment process. Thus,
relief from interest and penalties does get used as a bargaining chip in the
tax settlement process. This gives the Minister and the taxpayer flexibility
to waive penalties and interest that, beyond a nominal understanding of
tax debts, waives the time value of unpaid taxes. The extent of existing
ministerial discretion to waive interest (which can be viewed as a waiver
of part of the tax debt) and penalties suggests that further expanding the
Minister's discretion in concluding tax settlements would be unnecessary.

103. Interest may be waived during a taxpayer's temporary inability to pay, but reinstated when
the taxpayer's finances recover, or permanently if the account is uncollectible and the waiver or
cancellation will make it possible for some collection to occur. See Canada Revenue Agency, Taxpayer
ReliefProcedures Manual (Ottawa: CRA, May 2013) at s 8.1.1.1-8.1.1.3, online: <v2taxnetpro.com>
[Taxpayer Relief Manual].
104. See Canada Revenue Agency, Income Tax Information Circular IC07-1 "Taxpayer Relief
Provisions" (31 May 2007), online: <www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/ic07- I/ic07-1-e.html>.
105. TaxpayerRelief Manual, supra note 103.
106. Ibid at 6.1.
107. Some authors have argued that paragraph 5(d) of the Departmentof Justice Act, RSC, 1985, c
J-2 allows DOJ lawyers broader discretion to settle tax cases than can be exercised by the Minister.
See discussion by Robert G Kreklewetz & John Bassindale "Settlement of Tax Litigation" (2012) 20:2
Can Tax Highlights 5. However, DOJ lawyers cannot act without instruction from the CRA, and the
CRA cannot instruct them to do otherwise than "administer and enforce" tax legislation.
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The Minister keeps track of successful and unsuccessful taxpayer relief
requests, 08 and it is possible to request this information, in redacted form,
from the Minister under the Access to Information Act. 109 It is possible to
pick out trends in this information, but not to determine whether discretion to
waive interest and penalties is exercised in a consistent manner. According
to the results of an access to information request, "[t]otal relief granted
peaked at over $617,500,000 in 2008-2009 (an average of $10,113 per
request), and plummeted 75 per cent to $156,991,704 in 2011-2012 (an
'
As total relief plummeted, the number
average of $1,942 per request)."110
of requests for taxpayer relief shot up, perhaps in response to the generous
relief that had been granted in 2008-2009. It is possible to speculate that
total relief dropped as requests skyrocketed and as the Minister cracked
down on the exercise of discretion within the Taxpayer Relief branch.
Presumably the Minister attempts to ensure consistency in taxpayer relief
decisions through the use of the detailed and lengthy Taxpayer Relief
Manual, last updated in May 2013."' It appears that there is a temporal
inequity between taxpayers who applied for taxpayer relief in 2008-2009
or earlier, and taxpayers who applied later, when the average relief per
request dropped to approximately 20 per cent of what it had been in the
peak year for relief. However, without the ability to examine specific relief
requests and results, a conclusion that ministerial discretion has been
exercised inconsistently over time remains speculative.
Anecdotal evidence from tax practitioners suggests that discretion
is not exercised consistently. The Minister has guidelines to apply in
making a decision, but some taxpayers seem to be granted substantial
relief when they have not met the guidelines, e.g., for past diligence and
compliance with tax filings and payment. Other taxpayers who have been
diligent and who otherwise seem to meet the guidelines for extraordinary
circumstances and financial hardship may get comparatively less relief or
none at all. Some taxpayers who are denied taxpayer relief will challenge
the Minister's decision in Federal Court; however, with no information
about circumstances in which relief has been granted (since those facts

108. See reference to the Taxpayer Relief Registry in Taxpayer Relief Manual, supra note 103 at s
5.7.1.
109. Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A-1. The results of one of these requests can be found
in A Christina Tant, Federal Income Tax Litigation in Canada,vol 1, (Markham: LexisNexis, 2014)
(looseleaf revision 37).
110. Ibid, ch 4A at 43. Note that these numbers differ from those reported elsewhere, notably $45
million in interest for 2010-2011 reported by The Globe andMail, supranote 102, apparently because
The Globe and Mail number represents interest relief only, whereas the data gathered for the Tan text
combines relief from penalties and interest.
11l.Taxpayer Relief Manual, supranote 103.
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remain confidential) it is not possible to determine whether relief is always
denied or granted in analogous circumstances.
This lack of transparency in the taxpayer relief context is troubling.
While the Taxpayer Relief Manual is available as a result of access to
information requests, it is. far from clear whether the Minister applies
the criteria in that manual consistently in exercising discretion to waive
interest and penalties for similarly-situated taxpayers. The requirement
that tax settlements have a principled basis in law acts as a check against
arbitrary exercise of ministerial discretion in the context of tax settlements,
which remain confidential. The discretion to waive penalties is not
analogous to discretion to waive tax, since the public interest in imposing
penalties is distinct from the public interest in making sure all taxpayers
pay an amount of tax that is reasonably defensible under the law. The
former interest stems from an interest in having appropriate penalties for
taxpayers who do not comply with tax legislation, the second stems from
concern for fair treatment of all taxpayers, consistent with the principles of
horizontal and vertical equity. The discretion to waive interest is, in effect,
a mechanism for waiving the time value of outstanding tax liabilities, and
can thus be thought of as partial discretion to waive a limited amount of
tax on a compromise basis.
The limited ministerial discretion exercised in the realm of interest and
penalties does not suggest that the Minister should be granted discretion
to waive tax,"1 2 especially in light of the problems identified with existing
discretion, and the suspicion with which the public views taxpayer relief
for voluntary disclosures.
IV. The remainingargumentsfor compromise-basissettlement
1. Cost of litigationin aprincipled-basissystem
Proponents of compromise settlement argue that it would facilitate tax
dispute resolution, reducing costs for both the Minister and taxpayers. They
also point out that some all-or-nothing tax disputes appear to be impossible
to settle on a principled basis because, e.g., a single transaction cannot
be divided and characterized partly in favour of the taxpayer and partly
in accordance with the Minister's assessment. Therefore, net revenues
might increase if the Minister could settle such cases without proceeding
to trial. However, most tax disputes can be settled on a principled basis
by dividing receipts, expenses, claims for credits, and gains or losses into
different legal categories on a factual basis. Most tax disputes are about
facts that can be interpreted one way or the other according to the law, and
112. As suggested in Jackson, supra note 8.
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there are usually multiple amounts and issues in dispute." 3 It is not clear
that tax practitioners are significantly hampered by the requirement that
tax settlements must be completed on a principled basis." 4 Settlement on a
principled basis forces the parties to turn their minds to the merits of their
case. The alternative is settlement on the basis of litigation risk. While
litigation risk may make the settlement process more efficient, it is an
arbitrary criterion for a settlement process that accords with the rule of law.
Tax laws ought to be administered and enforced so that they apply with
equal force to all taxpayers. Proponents of compromise basis settlement
argue that it may even increase net revenue from the resolution of tax
disputes, since single-issue tax disputes will not be forced to litigation
before the Tax Court of Canada. Even if this were the case (and there are
good reasons to be sceptical, since most tax disputes settle before reaching
litigation in the current system) we should view the cost of insisting on a
principled basis as a cost of upholding the rule of law in tax administration
and enforcement.
2. Principledbasis as a barrierfor low income litigants
Critics have suggested that the principled basis itself is a barrier to justice
for low-income taxpayers, who are often unrepresented in tax disputes
with the Minister."5 If this is true, the principled basis might pose a de
facto problem for vertical equity, since lower income people have fewer
resources to deploy in using tax law to settle disputes. According to
this position, unrepresented taxpayers may be less able to formulate a
principled-basis settlement that accords with tax law than they would be
to negotiate a settlement on the basis of litigation risk. However, there is
no evidence to suggest that the principled approach itself (as opposed to
a simple lack of counsel) puts unrepresented litigants at a disadvantage
in settling tax disputes. Without empirical research on the impact of
principled and compromise basis settlement systems on unrepresented
taxpayers in tax disputes, it is only possible to speculate that one system
or another is easier for unrepresented taxpayers to navigate. As easy
as it is to assume that the principled basis is difficult for taxpayers to
navigate, it is also possible to speculate that the principled basis might
be simpler for unrepresented taxpayers to apply. Unrepresented taxpayers
113. CIBC World Markets, 2012, supra note 3 was an example of an all-or-nothing tax dispute;
however, it involved a dispute over the interpretation of the law. As noted above, there is value to
litigating, and setting a precedent for, points of legal interpretation.
114. See comments to the effect that terms of a principled basis settlement are usually available with
some creative drafting in Samtani & Kutyan, supranote 35. See also Kroft, "Settlement Strategies,"
supranote 31.
115. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 8.
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are in a good position to determine, e.g., which of their expenses can be
sacrificed as non-deductible on a principled basis when negotiating with
the Minister. Unrepresented taxpayers are perhaps less able to assess the
merits of compromise settlement on the basis of litigation risk, since they
are typically unfamiliar with the rules and costs of litigation before the
Tax Court.
Neither side of the principled vs. compromise settlement debate
has empirical grounds to show one system is simpler for unrepresented
taxpayers than the other. Either way, the more appropriate path to correct
potential inequity towards taxpayers who cannot afford counsel is through
access tojustice reforms in the CRA appeals process, and in the procedures
of the Tax Court of Canada. We have seen the amount-at-risk requirements
for the Tax Court's informal procedure, at which taxpayers may be selfrepresented and rely on relaxed rules of evidence, increase in 2013.116
Concern for access to justice for low-income and unrepresented taxpayers
should be directed at further measures to deal with the fact that the tax
dispute resolution process itself can be a barrier to equitable results for
those who cannot afford counsel.
3. A U.S. model of offers in compromise inCanada
Many of the proposals to expand ministerial discretion to settle tax disputes
on a compromise basis, including the Carter Report, refer to the U.S.
system of settlements in response to taxpayers' offers in compromise. The
U.S. Internal Revenue Code § 7122 specifically authorizes compromise
settlements." 7 The Internal Revenue Service's Internal Revenue Manual
allows for offers in compromise on the basis of "expected hazards [of
litigation]," among other criteria." 8 The IRS will also consider doubt as to
liability, doubt as to collectability, and offers for the purpose of effective
tax administration.'9
In December 2010, the Tax Executives Institute met with the
department of finance liaison, and recommended that the Minister be
granted the power to "settle objections based on an analysis of litigation

116. See Tax Court of Canada, "Practice Note 19 'Informal Procedure"' (20 January 2014), online:
<cas-ncr-nter03.cas-satj.gc.ca/portal/page/portal/tcc-cciEng/Process/practice19>: aggregate amounts
at risk and subject to the informal procedure are increased to $25,000 and losses in issue are increased
to $50,000.
117. 26 USC § 7122 (2015) [IRC]. See also 26 CFR § 301.7122-1 (1997) [Treasury Regs].
118. See US, Internal Revenue Service, "Legal Advice" in Internal Revenue Service, InternalRevenue
Manual(Washington, DC: IRS, 2004) Part 33 at 33.3.2.3.1, online: <www.irs.gov/irm/part33/irm_33003-002.html> [IRM].
119. See discussion in McNary, Lynch & Ldvesque, supra note 78 at 14:7, and IRM, supranote 118
at 33.3.2.

A Defence of the Principled Approach to Tax Settlements

risk."' 12° The "risks of litigation" language is similar to that used in the
United States' tax dispute resolution process. The recommendation was
rejected by the departments of justice and finance. The department of
finance added that "they were 'uncomfortable from a 'checks and balances'
view to grant additional authority to the CRA', and favoured a 'principlesbased approach' to settlement."' 12 ' Finance's position is consistent with the
CarterReport's concerns about risks of ministerial discretion, if not with
its recommendation that a U.S.-style system be introduced in Canada.
The department of finance may also be concerned that allowing
compromise settlements would incentivize taxpayers to threaten litigation
in order to settle for less than the tax owed.12 2 Settlement on the basis
of "expected hazards [of litigation] '' 23 would clearly be inappropriate in
such situations, and an increase in tax disputes would be an unfortunate
consequence of a policy intended to expedite settlement. Indeed, the
United States does seem to have a large volume of baseless offers in
compromise. CNBC reported that, in 2007, approximately 75 per cent
of taxpayer requests were rejected. 24 However, many of these were
"'frivolous requests,"' which are "often.. .advanced in large batches
by firms that market this service for a contingency fee.' 25 In order to
manage the administrative burden created by this flood of apparently
baseless settlement offers, § 7122(f) of the Internal Revenue Code
specifically allows the Secretary to treat frivolous submissions as though
they were "never submitted and such portion shall not be subject to any
further administrative or judicial review. ' ' 26 Including such a provision
in any Canadian legislative amendment could mitigate the problem
of incentivizing tax disputes through legally sanctioned compromise
settlements. However, it would introduce another troubling instance of
ministerial discretion: discretion to ignore offers in compromise with no
opportunity for judicial review. In the U.S., this extraordinary discretion
appears not to have completely prevented the submission of large
numbers of frivolous offers in compromise. It has often been suggested
that there would be a cost reduction to the Canadian government of tax

120. Ed Kroft, "Dealing with Tax Officials: Selected Issues in Administration, Enforcement and
Appeals" in Canadian Bar Association, 2011 Tax Law for Lawyers (CBA, 2011) 1 at 49.
121. Ibid.
122. See, e.g., Tan, supra note 109 at s 9.3.
123. IRM, supranote 118.
124. CNBC, supra note 78 and McNary, Lynch & Lvesque, supra note 78 at 14:7.
125. Ibid.
126. IRC, supra note 117, as amended. Note that there are two subsections (f) to this section. I refer
to the latter. Administrative review is available where the Secretary has not deemed such submissions
to be frivolous.
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dispute resolution if compromise settlements were permitted on the basis
of litigation risk. 27 It is not obvious that costs would be reduced, since
granting the Minister discretion to make compromise settlements would
simply add another layer of argument to every tax dispute and could invite
frivolous offers in compromise from taxpayers, as has been the experience
in the U.S.
A contrary view from a practitioner in the U.S. is that the ground of
effective tax administration for offers in compromise is underutilized in
part because they are so often rejected by the IRS, and there is a resulting
perception that such offers are typically rejected. 28 Where an effective
tax administration application does not involve hardship, the taxpayer
must demonstrate that "collection of the full liability would undermine
public confidence that the tax laws are being administered in a fair and
equitable manner."'12 9 Further, "[n]o compromise to promote effective tax
administration may be entered into if compromise of the liability would
undermine compliance by taxpayers with the tax laws."' 130 These seem
like difficult criteria for a taxpayer to meet, since they appear to involve
speculation by the taxpayer that horizontal equity would be maintained
were the offer accepted. The IRS is criticized for taking a restrictive
approach to considering such offers. The IRS states that, "'[b]ecause
the Service assumes that Congress imposes tax liabilities only where it
determines it is fair to do so, compromise on these grounds will be rare."'
This is said to exemplify a problem with the IRS's attitude towards this
type of settlement-even though this type of application does not involve
a claim of financial hardship. 3' The IRS's position on the application of
the tax law appears entirely reasonable, if viewed from the perspective
of all U.S. taxpayers, most of whom are presumably compliant with
U.S. tax laws. Exceptions to the even-handed application of tax law to
all taxpayers should be just that-exceptional. The Treasury Regulations,
correctly from this perspective, prevent the IRS from accepting effective
tax administration offers, absent hardship, exceptwhere public confidence
in the tax system is protected by the offer itself. The legal framework for
determining taxes owing in the U.S., as in Canada and other jurisdictions,
is grounded in judgments about who owes tax on what receipts in what
circumstances. Tax administrators should not be in the business of
127. Hogg, Magee & Li, supra note 55 at 569-570 and Jackson, supra note 8 at 308.
128. Sandy Freund, "Effective Tax Administration Offers in Compromise-Why so Ineffective?"
(2014) 34:1 Va Tax Rev 157.
129. Treasury Regs, supranote 117, § 301.7122-1 (b)(3)(ii).
130. Ibid, § 301.7122-1(b)(3)(iii).
131. Freund, supra note 128 at 173.
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effectively legislating special exceptions to those judgments. There is
some value in getting to an amount of tax owing that is defensible under
the law. As the American economist Henry Simons said in the context of
justifying progressive taxation:
The case for drastic progression in taxation must be rested on the
case against inequality-on the ethical or aesthetic judgment that the
prevailing distribution of wealth and income reveals a degree (and/or
kind) of inequality which is distinctly evil or unlovely.'32
In a democracy, our collective judgments about the correct amounts
of tax owing in particular circumstances should be reflected in the tax
law just as our judgments about the progressivity of the tax system
are. Those judgments ought not to be overridden by administrators in
reaching compromise settlements that do not have a principled basis in
law. Additional discretion risks introducing additional fairness concerns
if discretion is exercised in an inconsistent manner. The IRS's restrictive
interpretation of its ability to accept offers in compromise on public policy
or equity grounds is justified. Such circumstances might be akin to the
exceptional circumstances in which taxes can be waived by a remission
order in Canada.
It shouldbe noted thatthe effective tax administration category (on public
policy grounds where no hardship is claimed) for offers in compromise is
part of one of three grounds for offers in compromise in the U.S.' 33 Taken
together, the grounds for compromise settlement in the U.S. would be
redundant in the Canadian context. Doubt as to liability can, in most cases,
be settled on a principled basis grounded in a defensible interpretation of
the facts and law, while disputes as to the correct interpretation of law
can and should be decided by the courts. 3 4 Doubt as to collectability is
dealt with in the Canadian context by ministerial discretion to negotiate
payment plans with taxpayers, and through bankruptcy proceedings as a
last resort. The last criterion, of effective tax administration, covers two
kinds of circumstances. First, where enforcing the black letter of tax law
would cause taxpayers to suffer financial hardship.' 35 Second, where as a
132. Henry C Simons, PersonalIncome Taxation: The Definition of Income as a Problem of Fiscal
Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938) at 18-19.
133. Only 3 per cent of offers in compromise submitted in 2013 are effective tax administration offers
that do not involve circumstances of economic hardship. Freund, supra note 128 at 157.
134. See the discussion of CIBC World Markets, 2012, supra note 3, in the "Assessing the
Jurisprudence" section of this paper, above.
135. See Treasury Regs, supra note 117, § 301.7122-1 and Oei, supra note 13 at 1080-1081,
referencing the InternalRevenue Service Restructuringand Reform Act of 1998, Pub L No 105-206,
112 Stat 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the IRC).
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matter of public policy or equity, it would undermine public confidence
in tax administration to collect the full liability. The first aspect is covered
in the Canadian system by ministerial discretion to provide taxpayer
relief from interest and penalties, and the ability of collections officers
to negotiate repayment plans. The second is covered by the availability
of remission orders to clear tax debts in exceptional circumstances. In
light of the availability of mechanisms in Canadian law allowing relief
in circumstances comparable to those where offers in compromise are
granted in the U.S., and given the significant administrative burdens that
would be placed on the Minister if offers in compromise were permitted
in Canada, it appears unnecessary to introduce such a system in Canada.
4. Tax settlements and the socialsafety net
It has been suggested that the offer in compromise system forms part of the
social safety net in the U.S., due in part to the fact that relief is available
to taxpayers who would experience financial hardship. 3 6 Taxpayers who
are driven to financial ruin by paying their tax liability may end up taking
resources back from the government in the form of various social security
supports for low-income taxpayers. Proponents of this view argue that
taxpayers' future earning capacity may also be reduced, reducing net
revenue collection compared to a compromise system.'37 This theory
of tax settlement raises a conceptual problem. According to this theory,
relief from taxes under a compromise system should be considered a
tax expenditure, constituting social spending. The lack of transparency,
and high probability of inconsistency in permitting compromises on
tax owing to protect taxpayers from hardship, suggests that this kind of
social spending should be limited to extraordinary circumstances. The
government could not be held accountable for tax settlements concluded
in private, or justify the possibility of spending more on tax debtors in tax
settlements than other low-income people would receive in social security
transfers. If the general taxpaying public must support former tax debtors
through existing social security transfers, the aid provided to those former
tax debtors is at least transparent and comparable to the supports that a tax
compliant low income-person would receive.' 38 The case for expanding
this discretion as part of a social spending program, instead of merely
136. See Jackson, supra note 8, referencing Oei, supra note 13.
137. See, e.g., Oei, supra note 13.
138. Ibid at 1086-1093, deals with this objection by taking issue with the benchmarks of pre-tax
income and tax assessed, pointing out various indeterminacies in defining these amounts. This paper
relies on different premises: that there is value in enforcing tax assessed, since the tax law reflects
social and economic judgments in a democratic society, however murky a reflection the tax law might
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to facilitate settlement, is not compelling because of the probability that
tax concessions (i.e., spending) would become dependent on the litigious
nature of some taxpayers, and the resources they can deploy in disputes
with the Minister. The potential for financial ruin of taxpayers is addressed
already through the bankruptcy process,'39 through negotiations with
collections officers, and through taxpayer relief. Additional relief, in the
form of government revenue forgone, should not be provided to taxpayers
who owe more in tax than their total net worth. Such taxpayers may have
simply engaged in risky ventures or otherwise squandered their means.
These taxpayers should not be further underwritten by the social safety net;
they already have recourse to other mechanisms of relief inthe Canadian
system.
V. In defence of the principledapproach
The expansion of the Minister's discretion to reach settlements on a
compromise basis is not justified by any flaw in the current system of
principled-basis settlement. The Carter Report recognized the problems
with ministerial discretion to grant or deny advance ruling requests, at
least in the context of fairness to taxpayers making those requests. The
same problems apply in the settlement context: concern for fairness to
individual taxpayers and concern for equity between taxpayers ought to
bar the expansion of ministerial discretion, especially since no pressing
need for expanding that discretion has been demonstrated. Nevertheless,
calls to expand ministerial discretion to settle tax disputes on a compromise
basis, often modelled on the U.S. system, continue to be made.
The requirement that tax settlements be made on a principled basis
creates a barrier to settlement in very few cases. This is evidenced by
the fact that some 90 per cent of tax disputes are resolved by settlement
at the pre-litigation stage. 140 Even more are settled in the litigation
process. Given the high proportion of disputes that are settled, it appears
that the tax settlement regime in Canada is functional as is. Legislative
reform might only create inequities as a result of inconsistent exercise
of ministerial discretion, and as a result of some taxpayers paying less
than similarly-situated taxpayers with no principled basis for arriving at
different settlement terms. The flexibility to settle on a principled basis,
using some range of defensible interpretations of facts in dispute, is
already built into the Canadian tax system. That this flexibility could be
construed as an existing power to settle on the basis of litigation risk does
139. This is recognized even by authors advocating compromise settlement in Canada. See, e.g.,
Jackson, supranote 8.
140. Sandier & Campbell, supra note 8 at 764.
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not justify extending ministerial discretion to settle tax cases without any
principled basis in law. The current state of affairs is far preferable to one
in which tax settlements are permitted solely on the basis of litigation risk,
where the parties may reach an enforceable settlement without turning
their minds to settling on the merits at all.
The most basic purpose of taxes is to raise government revenue. In
a perfect democracy, tax legislation would codify society's collective
judgments about who should pay taxes, when, and how much. In the
real world, tax laws at least reflect some of society's judgments about
our financial responsibilities to one another. In Canada, the Minister is
charged with administering and enforcing tax legislation. She is therefore
charged with administering and enforcing a reflection, however imperfect,
of those judgments. We ought to insist that, when the Minister settles a
tax dispute with a particular taxpayer, she has ensured the amount of tax
settled upon is in conformity with a reasonable interpretation of how the
relevant tax statute applies to the circumstances of that taxpayer. Splitting
the difference in dispute would do a disservice to other Canadian taxpayers
who have the right, in a legal system governed by the rule of law, to expect
that the Minister is administering and enforcing the same tax laws with
which they must comply. A principled basis for tax settlements is what tax
legislation in Canada does, and should, demand.

